Three years after the removal of the fuel subsidy and the adjustment of the foreign-exchange regime, Nigeria’s revenue and external positions have improved significantly. After escaping the fiscal cliff as touted, but with the United States questioning the country’s fiscal transparency, the harder question is whether these gains can be translated into an economy worthy of the sacrifice Nigerians have endured.
There is an uncomfortable concern and interrogation Nigeria must confront as it evaluates the economic reforms that began in 2023, which has to do with understanding the consequences Nigeria would have faced without reform.
What if the petrol subsidy had remained? What if the foreign-exchange market had continued under its old distortions? What if government had not intensified revenue mobilisation through taxation, VAT, customs collections, statutory revenues and electronic money transfer levies? What if the loopholes that allowed significant economic activity to escape the tax net had remained largely untouched?
The question matters because the pain associated with the reforms has become so visible that it is easy to forget the economic crisis they were designed to prevent.
Three years later, Nigeria’s economic story is more complicated. On one hand, the numbers indicate a significant expansion in the government’s revenue-generating capacity and external buffers. On the other, the lived experiences of households continue to face severe pressure from food prices, transportation costs, inflation and declining purchasing power.
Significantly, the tax collection figures have risen from N12.3 trillion in 2023 to N27.1 trillion by July 2026, a 113 percent increase in less than three years, according to figures furnished by the Nigeria Revenue Service. The agency has linked the increase to tax reforms, digitalisation, new tax laws and efforts to close revenue leakages.
Nigeria’s gross external reserves have also risen to $52.52 billion as of July 17, 2026, from $50.47 billion at the end of May, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria. The reserve level is reported to provide roughly 11 months of import cover, well above the conventional three-month benchmark.
These are significant developments. But they do not, by themselves, prove that Nigeria has completed its fiscal recovery.
The United States Government’s 2026 Fiscal Transparency Report reportedly found that Nigeria had made insufficient progress in fiscal transparency. It said government budget documents did not provide a comprehensive picture of revenues and expenditures, raised concerns about discrepancies between approved budgets and actual implementation, and criticised weaknesses in the independence and reporting of Nigeria’s supreme audit institution.
That criticism strikes at the heart of the reform narrative. More revenue is not necessarily the same thing as more fiscal credibility.
A government can collect more money without demonstrating clearly how all of it is spent. A country can accumulate foreign reserves while still leaving questions about the completeness and transparency of its public accounts.
This does not erase Nigeria’s fiscal gains. It does, however, mean the gains must be subjected to greater scrutiny.
The removal of the petrol subsidy was arguably the most consequential reform, as this remains visible to the people. More confusing is that for many years, Nigeria devoted enormous public resources to keeping petrol prices artificially low. Deceitfully, as it were, the policy created an illusion of cheap energy and at the same time, fraudulently consumed resources that could otherwise have supported infrastructure, healthcare, education, social protection and productive investment.
The World Bank at the outset, estimated that subsidy removal would save approximately N2 trillion in 2023, with cumulative savings projected to exceed N11 trillion between 2023 and 2025 and this was compared with a scenario in which the subsidy continued.
In reality, and as a response to one of the queries, if Nigeria had refused to remove the subsidy, the implication is that the government would have had to find more than N11 trillion to sustain it over that period or absorb the cost through additional borrowing, expenditure cuts or arrears.
In such a situation, it would be said that the reform therefore did not eliminate the economic cost. It changed where the cost appeared.
Before reform, much of the cost was hidden in government finances. After reform, it became visible in petrol prices, transportation costs, food prices and household expenditure.
The social cost was immediate. The World Bank reported that retail gasoline prices rose by an average 163 percent following subsidy removal.
Yet the alternative was not cost-free. It was a system in which government continued subsidising consumption while struggling to finance development.
Nigeria was therefore not choosing between pain and no pain. It was choosing between immediate adjustment and potentially greater fiscal pressure later.
Honestly, one of the strongest pieces of evidence that Nigeria’s fiscal architecture today has changed is found in the revenue numbers, especially where it is said that tax collections increased from N12.3 trillion in 2023 to N27.1 trillion by July 2026, an additional N14.8 trillion.
Nigeria had therefore collected by July 2026 more than twice the 2023 tax take, even though the 2026 figure covers only seven months. That signals a potentially important shift from chronic revenue weakness toward stronger tax mobilisation.
Nigeria’s revenue problem has never been solely about tax rates. It has also involved a narrow tax base, informality, weak enforcement, leakages and government’s limited ability to capture economic activity.
Digitalisation, improved enforcement and new tax laws can change that. But the N27.1 trillion figure must be interpreted carefully. It represents tax revenue, not total government revenue, and is a nominal figure. Inflation, exchange-rate movements and higher nominal transaction values can contribute to the increase.
For proper verification of the development, the real test is whether the growth represents a sustained improvement in the tax-to-GDP ratio, fiscal capacity and public accountability.
The broader revenue picture reinforces the transformation. Reviewing the figures, World Bank data showed VAT rising from N3.6 trillion in 2023 to N6.7 trillion in 2024, an increase of about N3.1 trillion or 86 percent. Also, Customs revenue rose from N2.0 trillion to N3.4 trillion, adding N1.4 trillion, or roughly 69 percent.
Further data from the Bank showed that oil and gas royalties increased from N2.4 trillion to N6.3 trillion, while oil and gas taxes rose from N2.9 trillion to N5.9 trillion. Federal independent revenues also increased from approximately N2.0 trillion to N4.4 trillion.
These increases cannot all be interpreted as pure productivity gains. Inflation and exchange-rate movements matter. Nevertheless, they show that government has expanded its capacity to mobilise revenue.
The latest FAAC figures reinforce the point. In June 2026 alone, gross revenue available to the Federation was N4.501 trillion, comprising N3.701 trillion in statutory revenue and N799.746 billion in VAT. That monthly figure would amount to roughly N54 trillion annually if sustained, although such annualisation should not be interpreted as a forecast.
The more important question is now changing. It is no longer simply: “Where will government find money?” It is: “What is government doing with the money and can Nigerians independently verify it?”
That question becomes even more important when viewed against the foreign-exchange reforms.
Nigeria’s old FX structure produced distortions, shortages and opportunities for arbitrage. The subsequent adjustment was painful, as the naira lost substantial value and imported goods, machinery, raw materials and other inputs became more expensive.
But the same adjustment increased the naira value of foreign-currency-linked government revenues.
That creates another reform inconsistency: The exchange-rate adjustment that strengthened government’s nominal revenue position also weakened household purchasing power.
Customs collections illustrate this. As the naira value of dollar-denominated imports rises, customs revenue can increase in naira terms. But importers pay more, manufacturers face higher input costs and consumers ultimately bear much of the cost.
A reform can therefore strengthen government finances while worsening the immediate economics of households and businesses.
The much-touted fiscal cliff is the reserve story; nevertheless, represents an important macroeconomic gain. Nigeria’s gross external reserves reached $52.52 billion by July 17, 2026, up from $50.47 billion at the end of May. Compared with roughly $40 billion at the end of 2024, reserves have increased by more than $12 billion. The CBN says the current reserve position provides approximately 11 months of import cover.
For a country that spent years battling FX shortages, reserve depletion and pressure on the naira, a stronger external buffer is important. It improves resilience against external shocks and strengthens the credibility of the country’s external position.
But stronger reserves do not automatically mean Nigeria has completely “escaped the fiscal cliff.” Foreign reserves are primarily an external-sector buffer. Fiscal sustainability concerns government revenue, expenditure, deficits, debt, debt servicing and the credibility of public financial management.
Conflating the two would weaken rather than strengthen Nigeria’s reform argument. The counterfactual, however, remains compelling. Suppose the subsidy had remained. Suppose the old FX regime had continued. Suppose tax administration had not been digitised. Suppose VAT and customs collections had not improved.
Also, suppose tax revenue had remained around N12.3 trillion, rather than reaching N27.1 trillion by July 2026. The fact is that government would have had fewer resources while continuing to carry the subsidy burden. Foreign-exchange distortions would have remained. Reserve accumulation would have been harder. Borrowing requirements would likely have increased, while debt service would continue competing with development spending.
The arithmetic would have been brutal when adding together: high subsidy expenditure, weak revenue, FX distortions and persistent deficits would amount to greater borrowing pressure.
Then adding together: greater borrowing and high interest rates are equal to heavier debt service. And finally: heavier debt service plus weak revenue results in less money for development.
Come to think of the trend in the past, Nigeria might have enjoyed cheaper petrol and avoided some of the immediate inflationary shock, but it would likely have been postponing rather than eliminating the adjustment.
That is why the reforms were necessary. But necessary reform is not the same as successful reform. This is where the U.S. fiscal-transparency assessment becomes significant.
For investors, lenders, development institutions and citizens, transparency is an economic asset. If approved budgets cannot easily be reconciled with actual implementation, if revenue and expenditure information is incomplete, or if independent auditing is considered inadequate, confidence suffers.
Obscurity has an economic cost. It can increase the perceived risk of investing in the country, raise the cost of capital, weaken public trust and make genuine economic improvements harder to believe. Nigeria therefore needs to move beyond revenue mobilisation toward revenue integrity.
This aspect calls for clarity because if tax collections have risen from N12.3 trillion to N27.1 trillion, citizens deserve to know where the additional N14.8 trillion is going.
One critical truth is that if June 2026 generated N4.501 trillion in gross Federation revenue, citizens deserve to know how that money was allocated and what public value it produced. The same applies: if reserves have risen above $52.5 billion, policymakers must clearly explain the sources and sustainability of the accumulation. Also, if the removal of subsidies generated billions of naira in savings, Nigerians deserve a transparent accounting of those savings.
Transparency is therefore not an administrative luxury. It is part of the economic reform itself. More revenue does not automatically mean a healthier economy. A doubling of tax collections sounds spectacular. A $52.5 billion reserve position sounds impressive.
But nominal revenue can rise while real incomes fall. Customs revenue can increase because the naira value of imports has risen. VAT can increase because prices have risen even while households consume less in real terms. Foreign reserves can improve while citizens struggle with food prices.
The fiscal deficit also remains. This is as the IMF’s 2026 assessment projects government revenue and grants at around 10.8 percent of GDP against expenditure and net lending of about 14.2 percent. This left a deficit of approximately 4.4 percent of GDP.
It would be recalled that Nigeria’s 2026 federal budget provides for N34.33 trillion in expected revenue against N58.18 trillion in expenditure, as this includes N15.52 trillion for debt servicing, producing a projected deficit of N23.85 trillion, or 4.28 percent of GDP.
These figures demonstrate that Nigeria’s fiscal adjustment is unfinished. A country can collect more revenue and still run a large deficit. It can increase tax revenue and still borrow. It can accumulate reserves and still have millions of citizens struggling.
And it can improve macroeconomic indicators while facing legitimate questions about whether its fiscal accounts provide the complete picture.
The next phase must therefore focus on expenditure quality, transparency, independent auditing and productivity.
Nigeria’s first stage was stabilisation: remove the unsustainable subsidy, correct FX distortions, improve revenue mobilisation, digitalise tax administration, close leakages, rebuild reserves and restore fiscal credibility. But stabilisation is not prosperity. The next stage must be transformation.
The additional N14.8 trillion represented by the increase in tax collections must translate into productive economic capacity. Stronger revenue must support electricity, transport infrastructure, healthcare, education, agriculture, industrial development, security and social protection.
And Nigerians must be able to see and verify what their money is producing. This is where the reform story becomes a test of governance.
No doubt, the following, such as tax collections have risen from N12.3 trillion in 2023 to N27.1 trillion by July 2026. Foreign reserves have climbed beyond $52.5 billion. June 2026 generated N4.501 trillion in gross Federation revenue.
The subsidy burden has been substantially reduced. The FX market has undergone fundamental restructuring. These are significant achievements. But they are inputs, not the final outcome.
The final outcome must be a stronger, more productive and more transparent economy. How many Nigerians have moved into productive employment? How much has real household income recovered? How much has electricity reliability improved? How much has agricultural productivity increased? How much has the cost of doing business fallen? How much private capital has been attracted? How much has poverty declined? How much of the approved budget was actually implemented? And can an independent auditor verify the answers?
These questions will determine whether the reforms become transformative. There are two equally flawed positions in the reform debate. The first is to say the reforms were unnecessary because Nigerians are suffering.
The second is to say that because the reforms were necessary, every consequence should simply be accepted. Both are inadequate. Nigeria needed reform. But reform was never the destination.
The subsidy could not remain indefinitely. The distorted FX system could not remain indefinitely. The weak tax base could not remain indefinitely. Government’s ability to borrow indefinitely was also limited.
But Nigerians did not endure the resulting hardship merely to produce better fiscal statistics. They endured it because the promise was that the adjustment would ultimately produce a more stable, productive and prosperous economy. That promise must now be fulfilled and transparently demonstrated.
Nigeria may have moved significantly away from the economic cliff that confronted it in 2023. But stronger revenue and reserves should not be confused with complete fiscal recovery.
The numbers are encouraging. The U.S. transparency concerns are a warning. Both can be true. Nigeria has built greater fiscal space. It has rebuilt part of its external buffer. It has expanded its revenue capacity. Now it must build the bridge from those gains to the Nigerian household.
The country must move from higher revenue to higher productivity; stronger reserves to stronger investment; fiscal consolidation to better public services; GDP growth to better jobs; tax mobilisation to greater opportunity; budget announcements to measurable implementation; and macroeconomic stability to household prosperity.
The central question is no longer whether Nigeria should have reformed. It should have. The more important question is whether the government can now prove that the sacrifice was worth it.
Nigerians did not endure the removal of the fuel subsidy merely to make government finances healthier. They did not endure the naira adjustment merely to improve reserve statistics. They did not accept higher prices merely so that tax collections could rise from N12.3 trillion to N27.1 trillion.
They endured the adjustment because the old economic model had become unsustainable and because reform was supposed to lead somewhere better.
Now comes the harder part. Nigeria must prove that the money is there, that the money is properly accounted for, that it is being spent as authorised and that it is producing results. That is the real meaning of fiscal reform.
Nigeria may have strengthened its fiscal position. It may have rebuilt its external buffer. It may have expanded its revenue capacity. But the journey is not complete until it rebuilds something equally important, which is the public trust in the numbers and prosperity in the lives of its people.
The fiscal cliff may be behind Nigeria. The real challenge now is to build an economy and a fiscal system worthy of the sacrifice.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: blaise.udunze@gmail.com
